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The protection of platforms, pipelines and submarine cables under Australian and New Zealand law

Chapter


Abstract


  • Offshore facilities by and large did not exist before the middle of the nineteenth

    century, when the first submarine cables were snaked across the world's oceans.

    Likewise, platforms exploiting undersea resources, most notably oil and gas, did

    not exist until the middle of the twentieth century, with World War II providing

    the spur for states to overcome the technological challenges in exploiting the sea

    bed, and piping oil and gas across the ocean floor.

    For Australia and New Zealand these developments have been of tremendous

    impact. Since the nineteenth century, submarine cables connected the two states

    to the rest of the world, allowing communication times to be reduced from weeks

    and months to days, hours and ultimately virtually instantaneously. Today the

    bulk of telecommunications traffic, including telephone and internet, travels via

    submarine cable, and for Australia it is worth $5 billion to the national economy.

    Oil and gas platforms have allowed exploitation of substantial petroleum deposits

    to the extent that well over 80 per cent of such production in Australia, and

    virtually all of it in New Zealand, is produced in offshore fields.

    As such, the loss or disruption for an extended period of oil and gas supplies

    from offshore, or the severing of submarine communication links, would have

    a catastrophic effect on the economies of Australia and New Zealand. This

    underlies the importance of the protective regimes that exist internationally and

    domestically to protect these facilities from interference. This chapter considers

    the regime for the in situ protection of offshore facilities from terrorist attack,

    including platforms, pipelines and submarine cables under international, Australian

    and New Zealand law. Thile relevant to an overall strategy to combat

    terrorism, broader regulatory mechanisms such as the International Ship and Port

    Facility Security (ISPS) Code 1 will not be considered.

Publication Date


  • 2010

Citation


  • Kaye, S. (2010). The protection of platforms, pipelines and submarine cables under Australian and New Zealand law. In N. Klein, J. Mossop & D. Rothwell (Eds.), Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (pp. 186-201). Arbingdon: Routledge.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1462

Book Title


  • Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand

Start Page


  • 186

End Page


  • 201

Abstract


  • Offshore facilities by and large did not exist before the middle of the nineteenth

    century, when the first submarine cables were snaked across the world's oceans.

    Likewise, platforms exploiting undersea resources, most notably oil and gas, did

    not exist until the middle of the twentieth century, with World War II providing

    the spur for states to overcome the technological challenges in exploiting the sea

    bed, and piping oil and gas across the ocean floor.

    For Australia and New Zealand these developments have been of tremendous

    impact. Since the nineteenth century, submarine cables connected the two states

    to the rest of the world, allowing communication times to be reduced from weeks

    and months to days, hours and ultimately virtually instantaneously. Today the

    bulk of telecommunications traffic, including telephone and internet, travels via

    submarine cable, and for Australia it is worth $5 billion to the national economy.

    Oil and gas platforms have allowed exploitation of substantial petroleum deposits

    to the extent that well over 80 per cent of such production in Australia, and

    virtually all of it in New Zealand, is produced in offshore fields.

    As such, the loss or disruption for an extended period of oil and gas supplies

    from offshore, or the severing of submarine communication links, would have

    a catastrophic effect on the economies of Australia and New Zealand. This

    underlies the importance of the protective regimes that exist internationally and

    domestically to protect these facilities from interference. This chapter considers

    the regime for the in situ protection of offshore facilities from terrorist attack,

    including platforms, pipelines and submarine cables under international, Australian

    and New Zealand law. Thile relevant to an overall strategy to combat

    terrorism, broader regulatory mechanisms such as the International Ship and Port

    Facility Security (ISPS) Code 1 will not be considered.

Publication Date


  • 2010

Citation


  • Kaye, S. (2010). The protection of platforms, pipelines and submarine cables under Australian and New Zealand law. In N. Klein, J. Mossop & D. Rothwell (Eds.), Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (pp. 186-201). Arbingdon: Routledge.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1462

Book Title


  • Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand

Start Page


  • 186

End Page


  • 201