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Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing

Conference Paper


Abstract


  • In certificateless cryptography, a user secret key is derived from two partial secrets: one is the identity-based secret key (corresponding to the user identity) generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC), and the other is the user self-generated secret key (corresponding to a user self-generated and uncertified public key). Two types of adversaries are considered for certificateless cryptography: a Type-I adversary who can replace the user self-generated public key (in transmission or in a public directory), and a Type-II adversary who is an honest-but-curious KGC. In this paper, we present a formal study on certificateless key exchange (CLKE). We show that the conventional definition of Type-I and Type-II security may not be suitable for certificateless key exchange when considering the notion of forward secrecy which is important for key exchange protocols. We then present a new security model in which a single adversary (instead of Type-I and Type-II adversaries) is considered. We also construct a strongly secure certificateless key exchange protocol without expensive pairing operations. As far as we know, our proposed protocol is the first proven secure CLKE protocol without pairing

UOW Authors


Publication Date


  • 2011

Citation


  • Yang, G. & Tan, C. (2011). Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing. ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (pp. 71-79). New York: ACM.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-79956037223

Has Global Citation Frequency


Start Page


  • 71

End Page


  • 79

Place Of Publication


  • New York

Abstract


  • In certificateless cryptography, a user secret key is derived from two partial secrets: one is the identity-based secret key (corresponding to the user identity) generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC), and the other is the user self-generated secret key (corresponding to a user self-generated and uncertified public key). Two types of adversaries are considered for certificateless cryptography: a Type-I adversary who can replace the user self-generated public key (in transmission or in a public directory), and a Type-II adversary who is an honest-but-curious KGC. In this paper, we present a formal study on certificateless key exchange (CLKE). We show that the conventional definition of Type-I and Type-II security may not be suitable for certificateless key exchange when considering the notion of forward secrecy which is important for key exchange protocols. We then present a new security model in which a single adversary (instead of Type-I and Type-II adversaries) is considered. We also construct a strongly secure certificateless key exchange protocol without expensive pairing operations. As far as we know, our proposed protocol is the first proven secure CLKE protocol without pairing

UOW Authors


Publication Date


  • 2011

Citation


  • Yang, G. & Tan, C. (2011). Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing. ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (pp. 71-79). New York: ACM.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-79956037223

Has Global Citation Frequency


Start Page


  • 71

End Page


  • 79

Place Of Publication


  • New York