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Interpersonal relating

Chapter


Abstract


  • Getting clear about the nature and basis of interpersonal relating is a central concern of many recent debates in the philosophy of mind. The first section of this chapter highlights some basic facts about the complexity and multifaceted character of interpersonal relating and briefly overviews some of its most prominent dysfunctions. Popular mind-minding hypotheses which claim that the dysfunctions in question are rooted in impaired capacities for attending to and attributing mental states to others are then introduced. Next, recent evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience with which these mind-minding hypotheses must be made compatible is summarized. The important differences between two main philosophical frameworks-frameworks that offer opposing ways of understanding the nature of mind minding capacities are then highlighted. Focusing on these differences, the final section highlights how adoption of these philosophical frameworks matters to thinking about the prognosis and strategies for the treatment of certain mental disorders.

    This chapter is divided into five parts. The first highlights some basic facts about the

    complexi~y and multifaceted character of interpersonal relating and briefly overviews

    so~e. of tts most prominent dysfunctions. The second part introduces popular mind

    mmd~n.g hypotheses_which claim that the dysfunctions in question are rooted in impaired

    c~pantles for ~ttendmg to and attributing mental states to others. The third part summanzes

    recent evtdence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience with which these mind

    ~inding hypotheses must be made compatible. The fourth part highlights the important

    ~tfferences between two main philosophical frameworks-frameworks that offer oppost~

    g ways of understanding the nature of mind minding capacities. Focusing on these

    dtfferences, the final part highlights how adoption of these philosophical frameworks

    matters to thinking about the prognosis and strategies for the treatment of certain mental

    disorders.

Publication Date


  • 2013

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2013). Interpersonal relating. In K. Fulford, M. Davies, R. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini & T. Thornton (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry (pp. 240-257). Croydon, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1103

Book Title


  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry

Start Page


  • 240

End Page


  • 257

Abstract


  • Getting clear about the nature and basis of interpersonal relating is a central concern of many recent debates in the philosophy of mind. The first section of this chapter highlights some basic facts about the complexity and multifaceted character of interpersonal relating and briefly overviews some of its most prominent dysfunctions. Popular mind-minding hypotheses which claim that the dysfunctions in question are rooted in impaired capacities for attending to and attributing mental states to others are then introduced. Next, recent evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience with which these mind-minding hypotheses must be made compatible is summarized. The important differences between two main philosophical frameworks-frameworks that offer opposing ways of understanding the nature of mind minding capacities are then highlighted. Focusing on these differences, the final section highlights how adoption of these philosophical frameworks matters to thinking about the prognosis and strategies for the treatment of certain mental disorders.

    This chapter is divided into five parts. The first highlights some basic facts about the

    complexi~y and multifaceted character of interpersonal relating and briefly overviews

    so~e. of tts most prominent dysfunctions. The second part introduces popular mind

    mmd~n.g hypotheses_which claim that the dysfunctions in question are rooted in impaired

    c~pantles for ~ttendmg to and attributing mental states to others. The third part summanzes

    recent evtdence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience with which these mind

    ~inding hypotheses must be made compatible. The fourth part highlights the important

    ~tfferences between two main philosophical frameworks-frameworks that offer oppost~

    g ways of understanding the nature of mind minding capacities. Focusing on these

    dtfferences, the final part highlights how adoption of these philosophical frameworks

    matters to thinking about the prognosis and strategies for the treatment of certain mental

    disorders.

Publication Date


  • 2013

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2013). Interpersonal relating. In K. Fulford, M. Davies, R. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini & T. Thornton (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry (pp. 240-257). Croydon, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1103

Book Title


  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry

Start Page


  • 240

End Page


  • 257