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Leakage resilient authenticated key exchange secure in the auxiliary input model

Journal Article


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Abstract


  • Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols allow two parties communicating over an insecure network to establish a common secret key. They are among the most widely used cryptographic protocols in practice. In order to resist key-leakage attacks, several leakage resilient AKE protocols have been proposed recently in the bounded leakage model. In this paper, we initiate the study on leakage resilient AKE in the auxiliary input model. A promising way to construct such a protocol is to use a digital signature scheme that is entropically-unforgeable under chosen message and auxiliary input attacks. However, to date we are not aware of any digital signature scheme that can satisfy this requirement. On the other hand, we show that in the random oracle model, it is sufficient to use a digital signature scheme that is secure under random message and auxiliary input attacks in order to build a secure AKE protocol in the auxiliary input model, while the existence of such a digital signature scheme has already been proven. We will also give a comparison between the existing public-key encryption based and digital signature based leakage resilient AKE protocols. We show that the latter can provide a higher level of security than the former.

Publication Date


  • 2013

Citation


  • Yang, G., Mu, Y., Susilo, W. & Wong, D. S. (2013). Leakage resilient authenticated key exchange secure in the auxiliary input model. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7863 204-217. Lanzhou Leakage resilient authenticated key exchange secure in the auxiliary input model

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84883372536

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2484&context=eispapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1475

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 13

Start Page


  • 204

End Page


  • 217

Volume


  • 7863

Place Of Publication


  • Germany

Abstract


  • Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols allow two parties communicating over an insecure network to establish a common secret key. They are among the most widely used cryptographic protocols in practice. In order to resist key-leakage attacks, several leakage resilient AKE protocols have been proposed recently in the bounded leakage model. In this paper, we initiate the study on leakage resilient AKE in the auxiliary input model. A promising way to construct such a protocol is to use a digital signature scheme that is entropically-unforgeable under chosen message and auxiliary input attacks. However, to date we are not aware of any digital signature scheme that can satisfy this requirement. On the other hand, we show that in the random oracle model, it is sufficient to use a digital signature scheme that is secure under random message and auxiliary input attacks in order to build a secure AKE protocol in the auxiliary input model, while the existence of such a digital signature scheme has already been proven. We will also give a comparison between the existing public-key encryption based and digital signature based leakage resilient AKE protocols. We show that the latter can provide a higher level of security than the former.

Publication Date


  • 2013

Citation


  • Yang, G., Mu, Y., Susilo, W. & Wong, D. S. (2013). Leakage resilient authenticated key exchange secure in the auxiliary input model. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7863 204-217. Lanzhou Leakage resilient authenticated key exchange secure in the auxiliary input model

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84883372536

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2484&context=eispapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1475

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 13

Start Page


  • 204

End Page


  • 217

Volume


  • 7863

Place Of Publication


  • Germany