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Narrative practice and understanding reasons: reply to Gallagher

Chapter


Abstract


  • Gallagher writes, "My limited aim, in agreement with Hutto, is to suggest that there is no need to appeal to overly mentalistic theory-of-mind explanations for how we understand others" and that "narrative competence suggests an alternative to TOM approaches" (Gallagher: this volume). Indeed, he goes further and adds that "Our primary way of understanding others is worked out not via 3rd-person observation or 1st-person simulation, but via real (2nd person) interaction in pragmatic and social contexts" (Gallagher: this volume). Those familiar with my previous writings on narrative and folk psychology will recognise that all of this is music to my ears (Hutto 1997, 2003b, 2004). Indeed, making an extended case for these sorts of claims is the primary focus of several of my new papers, edited volumes and my forthcoming book, Folk Psychological Narratives. In this reply I highlight some aspects of the approach that I have been developing in those works.

Publication Date


  • 2006

Citation


  • Hutto, D. (2006). Narrative practice and understanding reasons: reply to Gallagher. In R. A. Menary (Eds.), Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto (pp. 231-247). Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/858

Book Title


  • Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto

Start Page


  • 231

End Page


  • 247

Abstract


  • Gallagher writes, "My limited aim, in agreement with Hutto, is to suggest that there is no need to appeal to overly mentalistic theory-of-mind explanations for how we understand others" and that "narrative competence suggests an alternative to TOM approaches" (Gallagher: this volume). Indeed, he goes further and adds that "Our primary way of understanding others is worked out not via 3rd-person observation or 1st-person simulation, but via real (2nd person) interaction in pragmatic and social contexts" (Gallagher: this volume). Those familiar with my previous writings on narrative and folk psychology will recognise that all of this is music to my ears (Hutto 1997, 2003b, 2004). Indeed, making an extended case for these sorts of claims is the primary focus of several of my new papers, edited volumes and my forthcoming book, Folk Psychological Narratives. In this reply I highlight some aspects of the approach that I have been developing in those works.

Publication Date


  • 2006

Citation


  • Hutto, D. (2006). Narrative practice and understanding reasons: reply to Gallagher. In R. A. Menary (Eds.), Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto (pp. 231-247). Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/858

Book Title


  • Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto

Start Page


  • 231

End Page


  • 247