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Making sense of nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein

Journal Article


Abstract


  • The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense

    in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as

    Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein,

    recognising such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the

    development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view

    that the notion of the ‘absolute paradox’ of the Christian incarnation is intended

    to be nonsensical. However, we recognise that Kierkegaard’s discussion of

    Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation.

    We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense

    and paradox we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches

    to, ethics and religion.

Publication Date


  • 1998

Citation


  • Lippitt, J. & Hutto, D. (1998). Making sense of nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98 (3), 263-286.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/783

Number Of Pages


  • 23

Start Page


  • 263

End Page


  • 286

Volume


  • 98

Issue


  • 3

Place Of Publication


  • http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/conant/Making%20Sense%20of%20Nonsense.pdf

Abstract


  • The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense

    in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as

    Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein,

    recognising such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the

    development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view

    that the notion of the ‘absolute paradox’ of the Christian incarnation is intended

    to be nonsensical. However, we recognise that Kierkegaard’s discussion of

    Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation.

    We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense

    and paradox we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches

    to, ethics and religion.

Publication Date


  • 1998

Citation


  • Lippitt, J. & Hutto, D. (1998). Making sense of nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98 (3), 263-286.

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/783

Number Of Pages


  • 23

Start Page


  • 263

End Page


  • 286

Volume


  • 98

Issue


  • 3

Place Of Publication


  • http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/conant/Making%20Sense%20of%20Nonsense.pdf