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Non-conceptual content and objectivity

Journal Article


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Abstract


  • In recent times the question of whether or not there is such a thing as nonconceptual content has been the object of much serious attention. For analytical philosophers, the locus classicus of the view that there is such a phenomena is to be found in Evans remarks about perceptual experience in Varieties of Reference. He famously wrote:

    In general, we may regard a perceptual experience as an informational state of the subject: it has a certain content -- the world is represented a certain way -- and hence it permits of a non-derivative classification as true or false. For an internal state to be so regarded, it must have appropriate connections with behaviour -- it must have a certain motive force upon the actions of the subject.... The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual, or nonconceptualised. Judgements based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualisation. (Evans 1982: 226-227).

Publication Date


  • 1998

Citation


  • Hutto, D. (1998). Non-conceptual content and objectivity. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6 (1998),

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1747&context=lhapapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/742

Volume


  • 6

Issue


  • 1998

Abstract


  • In recent times the question of whether or not there is such a thing as nonconceptual content has been the object of much serious attention. For analytical philosophers, the locus classicus of the view that there is such a phenomena is to be found in Evans remarks about perceptual experience in Varieties of Reference. He famously wrote:

    In general, we may regard a perceptual experience as an informational state of the subject: it has a certain content -- the world is represented a certain way -- and hence it permits of a non-derivative classification as true or false. For an internal state to be so regarded, it must have appropriate connections with behaviour -- it must have a certain motive force upon the actions of the subject.... The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual, or nonconceptualised. Judgements based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualisation. (Evans 1982: 226-227).

Publication Date


  • 1998

Citation


  • Hutto, D. (1998). Non-conceptual content and objectivity. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6 (1998),

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1747&context=lhapapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/742

Volume


  • 6

Issue


  • 1998