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Mental representation and consciousness

Chapter


Abstract


  • Intentionality and consciousness are the fundamental

    kinds of mental phenomena. Although

    they are widely regarded as being entirely distinct

    some philosophers conjecture that they are intimately

    related. Prominently it has been claimed

    that consciousness can be best understood in terms

    of representational facts or properties. Representationalist

    theories vary in strength. At their core

    they seek to establish that subjective, phenomenal

    consciousness (of the kind that involves the having

    of first-personal points of view or perspectives on

    the world - perspectives that incorporate experiences

    with specific phenomenal characters) is

    either exhausted by, or supervenes on, capacities

    for mental representation. These proposals face

    several serious objections.

Publication Date


  • 2009

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2009). Mental representation and consciousness. In W. P. Banks (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness (pp. 19-32). Oxford, United Kingdom: Academic Press.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84880670223

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/764

Book Title


  • Encyclopedia of Consciousness

Start Page


  • 19

End Page


  • 32

Abstract


  • Intentionality and consciousness are the fundamental

    kinds of mental phenomena. Although

    they are widely regarded as being entirely distinct

    some philosophers conjecture that they are intimately

    related. Prominently it has been claimed

    that consciousness can be best understood in terms

    of representational facts or properties. Representationalist

    theories vary in strength. At their core

    they seek to establish that subjective, phenomenal

    consciousness (of the kind that involves the having

    of first-personal points of view or perspectives on

    the world - perspectives that incorporate experiences

    with specific phenomenal characters) is

    either exhausted by, or supervenes on, capacities

    for mental representation. These proposals face

    several serious objections.

Publication Date


  • 2009

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2009). Mental representation and consciousness. In W. P. Banks (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness (pp. 19-32). Oxford, United Kingdom: Academic Press.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84880670223

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/764

Book Title


  • Encyclopedia of Consciousness

Start Page


  • 19

End Page


  • 32