Skip to main content

Consciousness

Journal Article


Download full-text (Open Access)

Abstract


  • Anyone who is looking for a clear, concise and accurate lay of the land

    with respect to contemporary, analytic, theories of consciousness

    would do well to get hold of this book. Its first half contains a

    handy survey and critical assessment of current theories of (1)

    qualia, and (2) what awareness of qualia involves. Yet it is not a textbook. For its second half, beginning at Chapter five, develops a new,

    representationalist theory of consciousness. Building on the insightful, but underdeveloped, ideas of Gilbert Harman, Hill’s main ambition is to defend a thorough-going representationalism about

    consciousness, while, along the way, refuting dualism and establishing that materialism, specifically a central state materialism sort, is

    still in good nick. He explores the implications of his new theory

    not just to the central cases of visual awareness and qualia, but also

    for pain, emotional experience and introspection.

Publication Date


  • 2011

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2011). Consciousness. Philosophy, 86 (2), 303-308.

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1730&context=lhapapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/725

Number Of Pages


  • 5

Start Page


  • 303

End Page


  • 308

Volume


  • 86

Issue


  • 2

Abstract


  • Anyone who is looking for a clear, concise and accurate lay of the land

    with respect to contemporary, analytic, theories of consciousness

    would do well to get hold of this book. Its first half contains a

    handy survey and critical assessment of current theories of (1)

    qualia, and (2) what awareness of qualia involves. Yet it is not a textbook. For its second half, beginning at Chapter five, develops a new,

    representationalist theory of consciousness. Building on the insightful, but underdeveloped, ideas of Gilbert Harman, Hill’s main ambition is to defend a thorough-going representationalism about

    consciousness, while, along the way, refuting dualism and establishing that materialism, specifically a central state materialism sort, is

    still in good nick. He explores the implications of his new theory

    not just to the central cases of visual awareness and qualia, but also

    for pain, emotional experience and introspection.

Publication Date


  • 2011

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2011). Consciousness. Philosophy, 86 (2), 303-308.

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1730&context=lhapapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/725

Number Of Pages


  • 5

Start Page


  • 303

End Page


  • 308

Volume


  • 86

Issue


  • 2