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Limited engagements and narrative extensions

Journal Article


Abstract


  • E-approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature

    of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non-representational variants

    these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding

    fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I-approaches. While

    promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable

    to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in folkpsychological terms. In this paper I outline the core features of the ‘Narrative

    Practice Hypothesis’ (NPH), showing how it might take up that burden in a

    way which complements non-representationalist E and I accounts. I conclude

    by addressing a new-order eliminativist challenge from Ratcliffe that questions, inter alia, the very idea that there is anything like a well-defined folkpsychological competence that needs explaining, thereby rendering the NPH

    otiose. Additionally, I respond to Ratcliffe’s claim that the relevant structures

    needed for the development of that competence do not reveal themselves in

    relevant narratives, rendering the NPH’s developmental story impossible.

Publication Date


  • 2008

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2008). Limited engagements and narrative extensions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16 (3), 419-444.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-57749126281

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/706

Number Of Pages


  • 25

Start Page


  • 419

End Page


  • 444

Volume


  • 16

Issue


  • 3

Abstract


  • E-approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature

    of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non-representational variants

    these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding

    fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I-approaches. While

    promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable

    to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in folkpsychological terms. In this paper I outline the core features of the ‘Narrative

    Practice Hypothesis’ (NPH), showing how it might take up that burden in a

    way which complements non-representationalist E and I accounts. I conclude

    by addressing a new-order eliminativist challenge from Ratcliffe that questions, inter alia, the very idea that there is anything like a well-defined folkpsychological competence that needs explaining, thereby rendering the NPH

    otiose. Additionally, I respond to Ratcliffe’s claim that the relevant structures

    needed for the development of that competence do not reveal themselves in

    relevant narratives, rendering the NPH’s developmental story impossible.

Publication Date


  • 2008

Citation


  • Hutto, D. D. (2008). Limited engagements and narrative extensions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16 (3), 419-444.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-57749126281

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/706

Number Of Pages


  • 25

Start Page


  • 419

End Page


  • 444

Volume


  • 16

Issue


  • 3