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Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle

Journal Article


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Abstract


  • The notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was put forth by

    Boneh et al. to enable a server to search from a collection of encrypted emails given

    a “trapdoor” (i.e., an encrypted keyword) provided by the receiver. The nice property

    in this scheme allows the server to search for a keyword, given the trapdoor.

    Hence, the verifier can merely use an untrusted server, which makes this notion

    very practical. Following Boneh et al.’s work, there have been subsequent works

    that have been proposed to enhance this notion. Two important notions include the

    so-called keyword guessing attack and secure channel free, proposed by Byun et al.

    and Baek et al., respectively. The former realizes the fact that in practice, the space

    of the keywords used is very limited, while the latter considers the removal of secure

    channel between the receiver and the server to make PEKS practical. Unfortunately,

    the existing construction of PEKS secure against keyword guessing attack is only

    secure under the random oracle model, which does not reflect its security in the real

    world. Furthermore, there is no complete definition that captures secure channel

    free PEKS schemes that are secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext

    attack, and against keyword guessing attacks, even though these notions seem

    to be the most practical application of PEKS primitives. In this paper, we make

    the following contributions. First, we define the strongest model of PEKS which

    is secure channel free and secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext

    attack, and keyword guessing attack. In particular, we present two important security

    notions namely IND-SCF-CKCA and IND-KGA. The former is to capture an

    inside adversary, while the latter is to capture an outside adversary. Intuitively, it

    should be clear that IND-SCF-CKCA captures a more stringent attack compared to

    IND-KGA. Second, we present a secure channel free PEKS scheme secure without

    random oracle under the well known assumptions, namely DLP, DBDH, SXDH and

    truncated q-ABDHE assumption. Our contributions fill the gap in the literature

    and hence, making the notion of PEKS

UOW Authors


  •   Ge, Chunpeng (external author)
  •   Fang, Liming (external author)
  •   Susilo, Willy
  •   Wang, Jiandong (external author)

Publication Date


  • 2013

Citation


  • Fang, L., Susilo, W., Ge, C. & Wang, J. (2013). Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle. Information Sciences, 238 221-241.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84876842378

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2088&context=eispapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1079

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 20

Start Page


  • 221

End Page


  • 241

Volume


  • 238

Place Of Publication


  • United States

Abstract


  • The notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was put forth by

    Boneh et al. to enable a server to search from a collection of encrypted emails given

    a “trapdoor” (i.e., an encrypted keyword) provided by the receiver. The nice property

    in this scheme allows the server to search for a keyword, given the trapdoor.

    Hence, the verifier can merely use an untrusted server, which makes this notion

    very practical. Following Boneh et al.’s work, there have been subsequent works

    that have been proposed to enhance this notion. Two important notions include the

    so-called keyword guessing attack and secure channel free, proposed by Byun et al.

    and Baek et al., respectively. The former realizes the fact that in practice, the space

    of the keywords used is very limited, while the latter considers the removal of secure

    channel between the receiver and the server to make PEKS practical. Unfortunately,

    the existing construction of PEKS secure against keyword guessing attack is only

    secure under the random oracle model, which does not reflect its security in the real

    world. Furthermore, there is no complete definition that captures secure channel

    free PEKS schemes that are secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext

    attack, and against keyword guessing attacks, even though these notions seem

    to be the most practical application of PEKS primitives. In this paper, we make

    the following contributions. First, we define the strongest model of PEKS which

    is secure channel free and secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext

    attack, and keyword guessing attack. In particular, we present two important security

    notions namely IND-SCF-CKCA and IND-KGA. The former is to capture an

    inside adversary, while the latter is to capture an outside adversary. Intuitively, it

    should be clear that IND-SCF-CKCA captures a more stringent attack compared to

    IND-KGA. Second, we present a secure channel free PEKS scheme secure without

    random oracle under the well known assumptions, namely DLP, DBDH, SXDH and

    truncated q-ABDHE assumption. Our contributions fill the gap in the literature

    and hence, making the notion of PEKS

UOW Authors


  •   Ge, Chunpeng (external author)
  •   Fang, Liming (external author)
  •   Susilo, Willy
  •   Wang, Jiandong (external author)

Publication Date


  • 2013

Citation


  • Fang, L., Susilo, W., Ge, C. & Wang, J. (2013). Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle. Information Sciences, 238 221-241.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84876842378

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2088&context=eispapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1079

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 20

Start Page


  • 221

End Page


  • 241

Volume


  • 238

Place Of Publication


  • United States