Skip to main content
placeholder image

(Strong) multi-designated verifiers signatures secure against rogue key attack

Journal Article


Download full-text (Open Access)

Abstract


  • Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create a signature whose validity can only be verified by a specific entity chosen by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated verifier, cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS) are a natural extension of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers. DVS and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract signing. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of MDVS and make two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious designated verifier tries to forge a signature that passes through the verification of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure involves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which an adversary is required to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this attack and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK assumption. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of strong MDVS. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

  • Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create a signature whose validity can only be verified by a specific entity chosen by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated verifier, cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS) are a natural extension of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers. DVS and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract signing. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of MDVS and make two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious designated verifier tries to forge a signature that passes through the verification of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure involves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which an adversary is required to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this attack and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK assumption. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of strong MDVS. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

Publication Date


  • 2012

Citation


  • Zhang, Y., Au, M., Yang, G. & Susilo, W. (2012). (Strong) multi-designated verifiers signatures secure against rogue key attack. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7645 (N/A), 334-347. Wuyishan, Fujian, China (Strong) multi-designated verifiers signatures secure against rogue key attack

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84871554001

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1191&context=eispapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/186

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 13

Start Page


  • 334

End Page


  • 347

Volume


  • 7645

Place Of Publication


  • Germany

Abstract


  • Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create a signature whose validity can only be verified by a specific entity chosen by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated verifier, cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS) are a natural extension of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers. DVS and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract signing. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of MDVS and make two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious designated verifier tries to forge a signature that passes through the verification of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure involves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which an adversary is required to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this attack and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK assumption. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of strong MDVS. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

  • Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create a signature whose validity can only be verified by a specific entity chosen by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated verifier, cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS) are a natural extension of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers. DVS and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract signing. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of MDVS and make two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious designated verifier tries to forge a signature that passes through the verification of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure involves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which an adversary is required to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this attack and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK assumption. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of strong MDVS. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

Publication Date


  • 2012

Citation


  • Zhang, Y., Au, M., Yang, G. & Susilo, W. (2012). (Strong) multi-designated verifiers signatures secure against rogue key attack. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7645 (N/A), 334-347. Wuyishan, Fujian, China (Strong) multi-designated verifiers signatures secure against rogue key attack

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84871554001

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1191&context=eispapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/186

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 13

Start Page


  • 334

End Page


  • 347

Volume


  • 7645

Place Of Publication


  • Germany