Skip to main content
placeholder image

Reaction attack on outsourced computing with fully homomorphic encryption schemes

Journal Article


Download full-text (Open Access)

Abstract


  • Outsourced computations enable more efficient solutions towards practical problems that require major computations. Nevertheless, users’ privacy remains as a major challenge, as the service provider can access users’ data freely. It has been shown that fully homomorphic encryption schemes might be the perfect solution, as it allows one party to process users’ data homomorphically, without the necessity of knowing the corresponding secret keys. In this paper, we show a reaction attack against full homomorphic schemes, when they are used for securing outsourced computation. Essentially, our attack is based on the users’ reaction towards the output generated by the cloud. Our attack enables us to retrieve the associated secret key of the system. This secret key attack takes O(λlogλ) time for both Gentry’s original scheme and the fully homomorphic encryption scheme over integers, and O(λ) for the implementation of Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

  • Outsourced computations enable more efficient solutions towards practical problems that require major computations. Nevertheless, users’ privacy remains as a major challenge, as the service provider can access users’ data freely. It has been shown that fully homomorphic encryption schemes might be the perfect solution, as it allows one party to process users’ data homomorphically, without the necessity of knowing the corresponding secret keys. In this paper, we show a reaction attack against full homomorphic schemes, when they are used for securing outsourced computation. Essentially, our attack is based on the users’ reaction towards the output generated by the cloud. Our attack enables us to retrieve the associated secret key of the system. This secret key attack takes O(λlogλ) time for both Gentry’s original scheme and the fully homomorphic encryption scheme over integers, and O(λ) for the implementation of Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

Publication Date


  • 2012

Citation


  • Zhang, Z., Plantard, T. & Susilo, W. (2012). Reaction attack on outsourced computing with fully homomorphic encryption schemes. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7259 419-436. Seoul Reaction attack on outsourced computing with fully homomorphic encryption schemes

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84864645155

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9407&context=infopapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/2072

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 17

Start Page


  • 419

End Page


  • 436

Volume


  • 7259

Place Of Publication


  • Germany

Abstract


  • Outsourced computations enable more efficient solutions towards practical problems that require major computations. Nevertheless, users’ privacy remains as a major challenge, as the service provider can access users’ data freely. It has been shown that fully homomorphic encryption schemes might be the perfect solution, as it allows one party to process users’ data homomorphically, without the necessity of knowing the corresponding secret keys. In this paper, we show a reaction attack against full homomorphic schemes, when they are used for securing outsourced computation. Essentially, our attack is based on the users’ reaction towards the output generated by the cloud. Our attack enables us to retrieve the associated secret key of the system. This secret key attack takes O(λlogλ) time for both Gentry’s original scheme and the fully homomorphic encryption scheme over integers, and O(λ) for the implementation of Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

  • Outsourced computations enable more efficient solutions towards practical problems that require major computations. Nevertheless, users’ privacy remains as a major challenge, as the service provider can access users’ data freely. It has been shown that fully homomorphic encryption schemes might be the perfect solution, as it allows one party to process users’ data homomorphically, without the necessity of knowing the corresponding secret keys. In this paper, we show a reaction attack against full homomorphic schemes, when they are used for securing outsourced computation. Essentially, our attack is based on the users’ reaction towards the output generated by the cloud. Our attack enables us to retrieve the associated secret key of the system. This secret key attack takes O(λlogλ) time for both Gentry’s original scheme and the fully homomorphic encryption scheme over integers, and O(λ) for the implementation of Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

Publication Date


  • 2012

Citation


  • Zhang, Z., Plantard, T. & Susilo, W. (2012). Reaction attack on outsourced computing with fully homomorphic encryption schemes. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7259 419-436. Seoul Reaction attack on outsourced computing with fully homomorphic encryption schemes

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84864645155

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9407&context=infopapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/2072

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 17

Start Page


  • 419

End Page


  • 436

Volume


  • 7259

Place Of Publication


  • Germany