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Server-aided signatures verification secure against collusion attack

Conference Paper


Abstract


  • Wireless handheld devices which support e-mail and web browsing are increasingly popular. The authenticity of the information received is important, especially for business uses. In server-aided verification (SAV), a substantial part of the verification computation can be offloaded to a powerful but possibly untrusted server. This allows resource-constrained devices to enjoy the security guarantees provided by cryptographic schemes, such as pairing-based signatures, which may be too heavyweight to verify otherwise.

    To gain unfair advantage, an adversary may bribe the server to launch various kinds of attacks --- to convince that an invalid signature held by a client is a valid one (say for providing false information or repudiable commitment) or to claim that a valid signature is invalid (say for spoiling the offer provided by an opponent). However, these concerns are not properly captured by existing security models.

    In this paper, we provide a generic pairing-based SAV protocol. Compared with the protocol of Girault and Lefranc in Asiacrypt '05, ours provides a higher level of security yet applicable to a much wider class of pairing-based cryptosystems. In particular, it suggests SAV protocols for short signatures in the standard model and aggregate signatures which have not been studied before.

UOW Authors


  •   Chow, Sherman S. M.. (external author)
  •   Au, Man Ho Allen (external author)
  •   Susilo, Willy

Publication Date


  • 2011

Citation


  • Chow, S. S. M., Au, M. & Susilo, W. (2011). Server-aided signatures verification secure against collusion attack. Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (pp. 401-405). USA: ACM.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-79956040239

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/1533

Has Global Citation Frequency


Start Page


  • 401

End Page


  • 405

Place Of Publication


  • USA

Abstract


  • Wireless handheld devices which support e-mail and web browsing are increasingly popular. The authenticity of the information received is important, especially for business uses. In server-aided verification (SAV), a substantial part of the verification computation can be offloaded to a powerful but possibly untrusted server. This allows resource-constrained devices to enjoy the security guarantees provided by cryptographic schemes, such as pairing-based signatures, which may be too heavyweight to verify otherwise.

    To gain unfair advantage, an adversary may bribe the server to launch various kinds of attacks --- to convince that an invalid signature held by a client is a valid one (say for providing false information or repudiable commitment) or to claim that a valid signature is invalid (say for spoiling the offer provided by an opponent). However, these concerns are not properly captured by existing security models.

    In this paper, we provide a generic pairing-based SAV protocol. Compared with the protocol of Girault and Lefranc in Asiacrypt '05, ours provides a higher level of security yet applicable to a much wider class of pairing-based cryptosystems. In particular, it suggests SAV protocols for short signatures in the standard model and aggregate signatures which have not been studied before.

UOW Authors


  •   Chow, Sherman S. M.. (external author)
  •   Au, Man Ho Allen (external author)
  •   Susilo, Willy

Publication Date


  • 2011

Citation


  • Chow, S. S. M., Au, M. & Susilo, W. (2011). Server-aided signatures verification secure against collusion attack. Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (pp. 401-405). USA: ACM.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-79956040239

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/1533

Has Global Citation Frequency


Start Page


  • 401

End Page


  • 405

Place Of Publication


  • USA