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Strongly Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange

Conference Paper


Abstract


  • Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols have been

    widely deployed in many real-world applications for securing communication

    channels. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First,

    we revisit the security modelling of leakage-resilient AKE protocols, and

    show that the existing models either impose some unnatural restrictions

    or do not sufficiently capture leakage attacks in reality.We then introduce

    a new strong yet meaningful security model, named challenge-dependent

    leakage-resilient eCK (CLR-eCK) model, to capture challenge-dependent

    leakage attacks on both long-term secret key and ephemeral secret key

    (i.e., randomness). Second, we propose a general framework for constructing

    one-round CLR-eCK-secure AKE protocols based on smooth projective

    hash functions (SPHFs). Finally, we present a practical instantiation

    of the general framework based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption

    without random oracle. Our result shows that the instantiation is

    efficient in terms of the communication and computation overhead and

    captures more general leakage attacks.

Publication Date


  • 2016

Citation


  • Chen, R., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Susilo, W. & Guo, F. (2016). Strongly Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange. In K. Sako (Ed.), Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016 (pp. 19-36). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84958960673

Start Page


  • 19

End Page


  • 36

Place Of Publication


  • Cham, Switzerland

Abstract


  • Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols have been

    widely deployed in many real-world applications for securing communication

    channels. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First,

    we revisit the security modelling of leakage-resilient AKE protocols, and

    show that the existing models either impose some unnatural restrictions

    or do not sufficiently capture leakage attacks in reality.We then introduce

    a new strong yet meaningful security model, named challenge-dependent

    leakage-resilient eCK (CLR-eCK) model, to capture challenge-dependent

    leakage attacks on both long-term secret key and ephemeral secret key

    (i.e., randomness). Second, we propose a general framework for constructing

    one-round CLR-eCK-secure AKE protocols based on smooth projective

    hash functions (SPHFs). Finally, we present a practical instantiation

    of the general framework based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption

    without random oracle. Our result shows that the instantiation is

    efficient in terms of the communication and computation overhead and

    captures more general leakage attacks.

Publication Date


  • 2016

Citation


  • Chen, R., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Susilo, W. & Guo, F. (2016). Strongly Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange. In K. Sako (Ed.), Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016 (pp. 19-36). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84958960673

Start Page


  • 19

End Page


  • 36

Place Of Publication


  • Cham, Switzerland