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Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership

Journal Article


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Abstract


  • I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective selfawareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.

Publication Date


  • 2017

Citation


  • Gallagher, S. (2017). Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership. Frontiers In Psychology, 8 1612-1-1612-10.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-85029688384

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4196&context=lhapapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3184

Start Page


  • 1612-1

End Page


  • 1612-10

Volume


  • 8

Place Of Publication


  • Switzerland

Abstract


  • I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective selfawareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.

Publication Date


  • 2017

Citation


  • Gallagher, S. (2017). Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership. Frontiers In Psychology, 8 1612-1-1612-10.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-85029688384

Ro Full-text Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4196&context=lhapapers

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3184

Start Page


  • 1612-1

End Page


  • 1612-10

Volume


  • 8

Place Of Publication


  • Switzerland