Skip to main content
placeholder image

What binds us together: Normativity and the second person

Journal Article


Abstract


  • Even if it appears quite evident that we live within society and as a consequence are bound together by shared norms and institutions, the nature of this relationship is a source of philosophical perplexity. After discussing the conditions of adequacy a conception of shared norms must accommodate, I discuss communitarian and interpretationist accounts of shared norms. I claim that they are problematic insofar as they fail to provide an adequate conception of the shared and binding character of social norms. Finally, I argue that a different understanding of the shared character of norms follows from a correct understanding of the conditions of adequacy at stake.

Publication Date


  • 2014

Geographic Focus


Citation


  • Satne, G. (2014). What binds us together: Normativity and the second person. Philosophical Topics, 42 (1), 43-61.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84971571443

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/2483

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 18

Start Page


  • 43

End Page


  • 61

Volume


  • 42

Issue


  • 1

Place Of Publication


  • United States

Abstract


  • Even if it appears quite evident that we live within society and as a consequence are bound together by shared norms and institutions, the nature of this relationship is a source of philosophical perplexity. After discussing the conditions of adequacy a conception of shared norms must accommodate, I discuss communitarian and interpretationist accounts of shared norms. I claim that they are problematic insofar as they fail to provide an adequate conception of the shared and binding character of social norms. Finally, I argue that a different understanding of the shared character of norms follows from a correct understanding of the conditions of adequacy at stake.

Publication Date


  • 2014

Geographic Focus


Citation


  • Satne, G. (2014). What binds us together: Normativity and the second person. Philosophical Topics, 42 (1), 43-61.

Scopus Eid


  • 2-s2.0-84971571443

Ro Metadata Url


  • http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/2483

Has Global Citation Frequency


Number Of Pages


  • 18

Start Page


  • 43

End Page


  • 61

Volume


  • 42

Issue


  • 1

Place Of Publication


  • United States